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ABSTRACT: This article reflects upon the Marxist tradition of  considering 
industrially produced cultural products as being inherently deceitful and politically 
misleading, trying to go beyond the avant-gardist prejudice of  the Frankfurt School 
that denies the spectator any agency. By giving an extensive rethinking of  initially 
Marx’s concepts, such as commodification, it is argued that it cannot be an object —
an art object in a specific space— in and by itself  that offers a way to escape from 
the working day, but that it is the tension between the object and the space in which 
it is presented that accords agency to the observer; whereby, the relation between 
object and subject are inherently different from, and eludes, alienation. In order to 
reach this conclusion, the article uses examples from both late 20th century and 
contemporary art . 1
  
Throughout the 1930s and early 
1940s a steady stream of  German 
exiles in flight from the Third 
Reich travelled from the East Coast 
to settle in Los Angeles. As if  by 
magic, a substantial portion of  the 
Weimar intelligentsia found itself  
transplanted along a line running 
from the Oceanside community of  
Pa c i f i c Pa l i s a d e s t h r o u g h 
Brentwood, Bel Air, and Beverly 
Hills to Hollywood (Schmidt 2004, 
148). 
The German exiled James Schmidt 
refers to counted Theodor W. Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer. Even if  they 
lived just outside Hollywood, Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s view of  the culture 
that was being produced there was 
anything but positive. When writing 
about the culture industry in their work 
Dialectic of  Enlightenment they state:  
[ T ] h e t e ch n i c a l m e d i a a r e 
relentlessly forced into uniformity. 
Television aims at a synthesis of  
radio and film. [I]ts consequences 
will be quite enormous and 
p r o m i s e t o i n t e n s i f y t h e 
impoverishment of  aesthetic 
matter (Adorno 1989, 124).  
 I would like to thank Volkan Çidam for his outstanding teaching on Marx. Without his diligence I 1
could not have written this article. 
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In the renowned chapter of  their 1944 
work, “The Culture Industry”, from 
which the previous quotation is taken, 
Adorno and Horkheimer seem to 
despise popular culture quite severely. 
Indeed, in his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno 
makes a clear distinction between the 
high and the low arts, a categorization 
that is also found, although not referred 
to by using the same categorical terms 
in “The Culture Industry”. Even if  this 
paper will mostly look into the 
opposition between the culture industry 
and the arts that emerges from Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s consideration of  the 
cul ture industr y in Dial e c t i c o f  
Enlightenment, the terms of  high and low 
art will be used as an additional way to 
refer to the distinction. The divide 
b e t w e e n “ l o w a r t , [ o r ] 
entertainment” (Adorno 2002, 240) and 
the high arts, in Dialectic of  Enlightenment 
can be solely understood to be based 
upon the way enter tainment is 
produced: in industrial fashion. Indeed, 
the technology of  the culture industry 
[led to] no more than the achievement 
of  standardization and mass production 
(121), whereby culture became an 
industry like any other industry under 
capitalism. However, the culture 
industry, by producing commodities 
that can be the vehicle of  messages, like 
films, makes products that can be, and 
are intentionally, endowed with 
powerful qualities of  deception. The 
term of  commodity as used by Adorno 
and Horkheimer should be understood 
like Karl Marx describes it in his Capital. 
In the first chapter of  his magnum opus, 
Marx explains that the commodity 
“appears as [an] autonomous [figure] 
endowed with a life of  [its] own” (1982, 
165), whereby the “relation between 
people” that the object encompasses 
“ t ake s on the cha r a c t e r o f  a 
th ing” (Lukács 1971, 83) . The 
appearance of  products as being 
detached from any social interaction is 
due to both the way an object is being 
produced, by “individuals who work 
independently from each other” (165), 
and the manner in which the products 
get exchanged. Because the working 
process is more and more atomized, the 
only significant social interaction that 
people undertake takes place during the 
exchange process, whereby the normal 
soc i a l r e l a t ions of  product ion 
themselves become obscured. The latter 
process certainly also holds true for the 
culture industry. However, the cultural 
product has another dimension, because 
it can express something and convey a 
message. The cultural product does not 
only hide social relationships between 
men because of  the way it is produced 
and exchanged, but also intentionally 
hides “social reality” (124) in order to 
maintain the hierarchy based upon the 
distinction between “the dispossessed” 
and “the people at the top” (121) who 
are the industrialists. Adorno and 
Horkheimer, in order to show how 
cultural products legitimize social 
hierarchy, analyze standard film plots 
and come to the conclusion that they 
propagate the illusion that being in a 
position of  power, and the possession 
of  riches is largely a matter of  chance 
obtained by “winning a prize” (146) or 
marriage, whereby, the person in this 
advantageous position cannot be held 
responsible neither be contested. Thus 
in a similar manner to the commodity 
Marx speaks of  in Capital, the cultural 
commodity also does not portray social 
relations justly. 
Adorno, in his Aesthetic Theory, accords 
great importance to what he calls the 
truth content of  art. “The truth content 
of  artworks is fused with their critical 
content” (Adorno 2002, 35). As Michael 
Kelly confirms it, the question of  art 
for Adorno is above all a question of  
“how art can best realize its truth 
content and thus its capacity for 
critique” (Kelly 2007, 100). In contrast 
to the high arts, entertainment, 
according to Adorno, does not dispose, 
as he demonstrates in “Culture 
Industry”, of  any truth content. On the 
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contrary, he repeatedly refers to it as the 
untruth. Seeing a distinction between 
the high and the low arts based upon 
the way they are produced or their 
ability of  offering social critique, 
however, seems quite an irrelevant 
position to be taking in the 21st century. 
Contemporary art, broadly dated from 
the 1950s onwards, presents many cases 
of  artworks that are produced in 
industrial fashion and do not engage in 
direct social critique. Andy Warhol is a 
perfect example of  an artist who 
adapted intensive modes of  production 
that he retrieved from the media 
business, and even called his studio the 
factory. The efficiency of  taking Warhol’s 
practice as a way to prove that Adorno’s 
categorization of  high and low art do 
hold anymore is indeed doubtful, for it 
has to be acknowledged that Adorno 
also views the new to be a quality of  the 
high arts. 
High art, according to Adorno, 
distinguishes itself  from the culture 
industry by continuously challenging 
itself  in finding new forms of  aesthetic 
expression. Indeed, Warhol’s manner of  
production was quite revolutionary in 
the art world at the time. However, 
trying to determine which one has more 
weight on the other, the mode of  
production or challenging to find new 
forms of  expression, in order to classify 
Warhol, does not bring its appreciation 
any further. In addition to which, it is 
debatable whether his work was 
intended as a controversial critique of  
the popular media. The imitation of  its 
style and fascination for celebrities, 
however, makes it impossible to deduce 
from his art itself  whether it was or not 
intended ironically. Tracey Emin’s work 
My Bed, firstly exhibited in 1999,  
expressed the aftermath of  a 
relationship break-up, with dirty, 
rumpled sheets, and detritus 
including cigarette ends, condoms, 
d e s i c c a t e d a p p l e c o r e s , 
contraceptives, a used tampon, a 
child’s toy, vodka bottles and dirty 
knickers (Fanthome 2008),  
by exhibiting, as the title indicates, her 
own bed. Emin’s work is self-reflective 
upon very intimate and private matters. 
It does not concern itself, overtly, with 
larger societal questions. The work in 
itself  is a ready-made: a mass-produced 
item exhibited in an art space. Thus, 
both Warhol’s and Emin’s work contain 
elements which are found in Adorno’s 
view of  the culture industry and low art. 
Judging upon the previously discussed 
features of  the art works, it could be 
concluded that both do not deserve the 
name of  art. Simply trying to determine 
whether we should call something art or 
not is likely to reveal more about the 
preferences of  the categorizer than 
about the artwork or object itself. 
Therefore, it might be more fruitful to 
depart from another consideration that 
can be distilled from Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s text, which looks at the 
relation between a cultural product and 
its audience or spectator and its 
subsequent effects. It is in this view that 
Emin’s and Warhol’s work will be 
reconsidered later on. 
!  
Fig. 1. Tracey Emin, 1998. My Bed .  2
 Emin, Tracey. 1998. My Bed. Tate Modern, London. Source: Wikipedia, posted 24 July 2011, 2
accessed, 08 January 2015, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Bed#/media/File:Emin-My-
Bed.jpg>.
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Apart from giving a definition of  the 
culture industry based upon the manner 
in which it organises the production 
process, or upon the inherent untruth 
content of  low art, Adorno also briefly 
insinuates a consideration of  cultural 
products based upon an interaction 
between object and spectator. Adorno 
sees a paradoxical claim in amusement. 
“[U]nder late capitalism”, cultural 
products are told to offer “an escape 
from the mechanized work process”, 
and yet Adorno observes, they are but 
“the prolongation of  work” (Adorno 
1989, 137). It is very important to note 
that the kind of  work meant by Adorno 
in this case is “the mechanized” form 
he mentions, i.e. factory work, and not 
any other type. The entertainment 
industry, in order to produce the 
oblivious bliss that the worker desires 
after his hard day of  work, avoids “[a]ny 
logical connection calling for mental 
effort” (139), whereby it does not 
distinguish itself  from the work he is 
accustomed to carry out. By the latter 
intentional lack of  complexity, or 
demand for participation, the cultural 
commodity does not accord any agency 
to the observer; in opposition to high 
art which does incite the audience to 
reflect. By according agency to someone 
you affirm his or her existence as 
person who is able to reason. Whereas 
Adorno views the latter quality of  art to 
be inherent to the work itself, it will be 
argued, in this paper, by mainly looking 
at contemporary art, that it is not the 
object in and by itself  that offers a way 
to escape from the working day, but that 
it is the tension between the object and 
the space in which it is presented that 
accords agency to the observer; 
whereby, the relation between object 
and subject are inherently different 
from, and eludes, alienation. 
In order to determine the importance 
of  space, here understood as the 
contemporary art space  whether it is a 3
museum, a gallery, a temporary 
exhibition or a public space, Adorno’s 
view of  the artwork’s capacity to accord 
agency to the spectator will be put into 
the light of  Marx’s conception of  
estranged labour. Subsequently, it will 
be shown, by using the distinction Hito 
Steyerl makes between the factory and 
the museum, that it is not necessarily 
the object in itself  that accords agency 
to its observer, but the space in relation 
to the object. Throughout the essay, 
emphasis will be put upon illustrating 
every argument by examples from 
contemporary art, as a way to peruse 
how the art world in the 21st century 
can offer resistance to alienation as 
defined by Marx. 
Al though i t i s not spec i f ica l ly 
mentioned in “The Culture Industry”, 
the reason why art can offer an escape 
from work can be explained when put 
into the light of  Marx’s conception of  
estranged labour. The more apparent 
reason given why entertainment cannot 
offer a way out of  the worker’s routine 
is that “mechanization has such power 
over a man’s leisure and happiness, and 
so p ro found l y de t e r m ines the 
manufacture of  amusement goods, that 
h i s expe r i ence s a r e i nev i t ab l y 
afterimages of  the work process 
itself ” (Adorno 1989, 137). Labour is, 
thus, overwhelming to an extent that the 
worker cannot easily put it out of  his 
mind when spending time at the 
cinema, in addition to which the 
manner films are being produced are 
reminiscent of  factory work. However, 
as mentioned earlier on, the cultural 
product; does not demand any effort on 
beha l f  o f  the consumer. “No 
 Spaces, as referred to throughout the essay, will here denote art spaces as they are most commonly 3
experienced today. Not only the white cube, but any space curated as to exhibit artworks. This paper 
will not hold any historical claim by contrasting current curating practices with older ones. The 
conclusion, certainly, is not that our contemporary practices are preferable in any way to, for example, 
the Victorian gallery customs.
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independent thinking must be expected 
from the audience: the product 
prescribes every reaction” (137). 
Adorno’s previous observation means 
that the audience does not undergo any 
interaction with the cultural product: he 
or she is a passive consumer. The state 
of  being passive, thus, although 
seemingly contradictory is indirectly 
equated with the labourer’s routine. The 
latter equation can be understood when 
considering Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, in 
which he describes the process of  
becoming alienated: an inevitable 
consequence of  capitalist labour and 
production. 
According to Marx, the “essential being 
of  man”, or “man’s essence”, is defined 
by his “free conscious activity” and 
“conscious life activity” (Marx 1964, 
328), which he can realize through the 
“appropria[tion of] nature” (334) by 
means of  which he sustains himself, i.e. 
work. However, under capitalism, or in 
another system in which a superior 
owns another man’s activity, labour is 
estranging, since it “does not belong to 
[the worker’s] essential being”, whereby 
consequently he cannot “confirm 
himself  in his work” (327). 
In order to understand how alienation 
works in connection to “man’s 
essence” (328), apart from another man 
owning the activity and the products of  
labour of  another man, it is helpful to 
look into Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
H e g e l ’s c o n c e p t i o n o f  s e l f -
consciousness as appears in The 
Phenomenology of  Spirit. According to 
Hegel, self-consciousness is inherently 
part of  man. At the same time, man is 
not aware of  the truth of  his own self-
consciousness, or being-for-self, which 
needs to be triggered by an external 
object. The previous process is 
explained to take place between 
subjects. Firstly, subject A recognizes 
subject B to be self-conscious, like him. 
However, subject A does not yet 
recognize subject B as an independent 
self-conscious being, and therefore 
needs to supersede subject B in a 
conflict whereby he will realize that 
subject B is an independent subject. 
Hege l ’s unders tanding of  se l f -
consciousness recognition can, thus, be 
said to be about becoming aware of  
your own humanity via an externality. 
Marx’s ideas regarding the products of  
labour and labour itself  function in a 
similar manner. By means of  my labour 
I realize myself  in the external world, 
whereby I can recognize myself  in the 
world surrounding me. Within a similar 
process that Hegel describes, but in this 
case without subjects but objects, by 
looking at the products of  my own 
labour I would be able to become 
certain of  the truth of  my own self-
consciousness. However, due to the 
re l a t ions of  product ion under 
capitalism the worker labours for 
somebody else, producing great 
quantities, and not in the image of  what 
he is. Therefore, he is unable to 
recognize himself  in the external world, 
which leaves him alienated, estranged 
from his own humanity. He is unable to 
recognize his own distinctly human 
essence as a free conscious being. As a 
consequence, man becomes quite close 
to an animal state, “acting freely only in 
his animal functions – eating, drinking 
and procreating”(Marx 1964, 327). 
Whereas animals only produce to 
maintain themselves, man can do so 
disinterestedly. By suggesting the 
existence of  an alienated state of  man, 
Marx at the same time pre-supposes the 
existence of  a non-alienated state. 
Therefore, the non-alienated state of  
subjects would be when they are able to 
realize themselves as human beings, 
according to its humanist definition. 
Indeed, Marx’s view of  estranged labour 
should be seen as fully inscribed in the 
humanist tradition that views man’s 
essence to lie within his capacity to 
shape the world around him due to his 
intellect. Of  course, the validity of  
Marx’s humanistic stance is debatable 
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and can be easily criticized from a post-
humanist perspective. His view, 
however, is valuable when put into the 
context of  Adorno’s analysis of  the 
culture industry, which will offer a way 
to understand why entertainment is an 
extension of  the factory. 
Apart from cultural commodities not 
having the quality of  offering subjects 
the possibility to realize themselves, 
they also do not function as objects of  
recognition. When the worker watches a 
film he cannot realize himself; he 
cannot express his own humanity in 
relation to the cultural product because 
it asks him, above all, not to think. 
Therefore, the cultural products as 
described by Adorno, sustain the 
worker’s alienation, instead of  offering 
temporary relief. In addition, the 
commodities Adorno describes do not 
reflect truth content, or social reality, 
since the culture industry only seeks to 
maintain the hierarchy it needs to 
sustain itself, which ultimately is the 
social domination that capitalism holds 
up and requires: 
The dependence of  the most 
powerful broadcasting company on 
the electrical industry, or of  the 
motion picture industry on the 
banks, is characteristic of  the 
whole sphere, whose individual 
b r a n c h e s a r e t h e m s e l v e s 
economically interwoven. All are in 
such close contact that the extreme 
concentration of  mental forces 
allows demarcation lines between 
different firms and technical 
branches to be ignored (Adorno 
and Horkheimer 1989, 123). 
Adorno shows how the culture industry, 
therefore, does not represent the world 
of  the labourer, but only the one that 
the capitalists want its workforce to 
believe in. Taking into account the 
previously mentioned intentions on 
behalf  of  the industrialists, cultural 
commodities do not deny that life is 
hard and that some suffer. On the 
contrary, they admit it. The cultural 
products depict stories in which, 
because of  the kindness of  others “[n]o 
one is forgotten; everywhere there are 
n e i g h b o r s a n d w e l f a r e 
workers” (Adorno 1989, 150). As an 
illustration he uses the 1942 drama film 
Calling Dr. Gillespie. The eponymous 
character represents those of  whom the 
“hearts are in the right place and who, 
by their kind intervention as of  man to 
man, cure individual cases of  socially-
perpetuated distress” (151). By painting 
a society as being bearable due to the 
charity of  others its suffering has been 
admitted to, embraced, and accepted in 
the view of  the aid and warmth of  
others. The previous image is very 
unlikely to stir up a revolt in the cinema 
seats; the very end the culture industry 
aims at, according to Adorno. The 
images that “mass culture” provides 
deliberately do not offer a true 
possibility of  recognition for the 
working class. The laborers when 
consuming the products of  the culture 
industry, as a consequence, are unable 
to find some relief  for their daily toil in 
the factory, as the mechanism of  
recognit ion of  one’s own self-
consciousness cannot take place. 
Entertainment leaves the worker as 
estranged as he or she was when leaving 
the conveyor belt. 
Since Adorno sees the non-interaction 
between object and subject as 
undesirable, it equally means that the 
opposite, the existence of  interaction, is 
the more desirable way of  humans to 
relate to objects. This consideration of  
Adorno’s view regarding cultural 
commodit ies is not specif ical ly 
mentioned in Dialectic of  Elightenment. 
However, the distinction between the 
erotic and the pornographic he makes 
could be seen as a differentiation 
between objects that accord agency to 
the viewer and those that deny agency. 
“The culture industry is [characterized 
as] pornographic”, giving the audience 
the fulfillment of  longing that can never 
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be realized. Mass culture shows “the 
objects of  desire, breasts in a clinging 
sweater or the naked torso of  the 
a t h l e t i c h e r o ” ( A d o r n o a n d 
Horkheimer, 1989, 140) in incessant 
repetition. The “erotic situation” on the 
other hand, “does not fail to indicate 
unmistakably that things can never go 
that far”. In Adorno’s view the 
dissimilarity between the erotic and the 
pornographic lies above all in that it 
“cheats its consumers of  what it 
perpetually promises” (140). However, 
acclaiming that works of  art “by 
representing deprivation as negative, 
they retracted, as i t were, the 
prostitution of  the impulse and rescued 
by mediation what was denied” implies 
that the work of  art undergoes a 
relation by taking the reality of  the 
subject into account. The erotic, by 
imaging a world from the perspective of  
a possible real subject, allows for 
recognition on behalf  of  the one who 
interacts with it; whereby, it grants the 
subject agency. 
Although it can probably not be 
claimed, judging from Adorno’s 
description, that the erotic asks the 
observer to think or to engage with the 
object consciously; works of  art, 
h o w e ve r , c a n b e a n a l y z e d a s 
engendering such effects on behalf  of  
its viewers. Coming back upon the 
firstly mentioned criteria of  distinction, 
Anish Kapoor’s 2004 giant sculpture 
Cloud Gate is a good example of  a piece 
that does not offer any social critique 
and was produced, just like most of  
Kapoor’s work, in an industrial manner. 
When considering the secondly treated 
criteria of  categorization, Kapoor’s 
piece has qualities that are very 
reminiscent of  Adorno’s consideration 
of  art in opposition to entertainment. 
Kapoor’s Cloud Gate, a ten-meter high 
mirror-surfaced object, accords agency 
to the visitor of  Millennium Park. The 
sculpture is mute to the extent that it 
asks all interpretation on behalf  of  its 
viewers and forces them to be engaged 
with it by means of  showing them their 
own reflection. Although the structure 
presents an abstract shape, the mirror 
surface quite literally serves the purpose 
of  recognition in the object. At such, it 
becomes a place for reflection to be 
used by each in his or her own manner. 
When reviewing the works earlier 
mentioned, Emin’s work My Bed, and, 
for example, Warhol’s Orange Car Crash 
Fourteen Times they, like Kapoor’s work, 
d raw the aud ience in to ac t ive 
participation. Even if  My Bed presents 
the particular state that Emin found 
herself  in, during a period of  
depression, the unmade room and the 
sheer mess are two points of  
recognition for all, and offer a point of  
departure to think about general 
psychological problems or more 
personal concerns, let alone about one’s 
own definition of  art.  
Warhol’s 1963 Orange Car Crash, which 
as the title suggests, depicts an identical 
picture from an automobile accident 
found in a newspaper fourteen times, 
equally, shows scenes that everyone 
recognizes, perhaps, from personal 
experience, but most likely from the 
news. The repetition of  the prints asks 
the viewer to question not only the 
work in itself, but the obsession with 
which death and blood are being 
mediatized. 
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Fig. 2. Anish Kapoor, 2004. Cloud Gate . 4
The only problem that, however, 
remains with Emin’s and Warhol’s work 
is that it is highly unlikely a person 
engages in conscious reflection caused 
by the sight of  his own bed every 
morning, or incessantly questions the 
val idi ty of  the content of  his 
newspaper. Adorno’s observations 
regarding the effects of  cultural 
commodities upon its consumers 
o r i g ina t e f rom the ob j ec t s i n 
t h e m s e l v e s . M a s s - p r o d u c e d 
entertainment always forces upon its 
users a created need : it greatly insults 5
his or her agency. The work of  art, 
however, does not fill in the blanks, nor 
tells its audience necessarily what to 
think, but gives some space for 
interpretation. My Bed and Orange Car 
Crash, however, suggest that the 
previous quality of  art does not stem 
from the objects themselves, in which 
case there would be no difference 
between manufactured goods and art. 
!  
Fig. 3. Andy Warhol, 1963. Orange Car Crash 
Fourteen Times . 6
Steyerl’s essay “Is a Museum a Factory?” 
offers a view in order to understand 
how space can function as an entity that 
enables its visitors to act as conscious 
agents. Steyerl’s first observation is that 
the museum and the factory can be 
compared to each other because they 
both produce: 
I n t h e mu s e u m - a s - f a c t o r y, 
someth ing cont inues to be 
produced. Installation, planning, 
carpentry, viewing, discussing, 
maintenance, betting on rising 
values, and networking alternate in 
cycles. An art space is a factory, 
w h i ch i s s i mu l t a n e o u s l y a 
supermarket –a casino and a place 
of  worship whose reproductive 
work is performed by cleaning 
ladies and cellphone– video 
bloggers alike (Steyerl 2012, 63). 
When considering how each space 
controls bodies, however, she continues 
to argue that the museum is essentially 
distinct from the industrial factory but 
similar to the social factory. The factory 
receives and releases bodies at a set time 
 Kapoor, Anish. 2004. Cloud Gate. Stainless steel sculpture. 33 ft × 42 ft × 66 ft. Millennium Park, 4
Chicago. Source: Wikipedia, posted 06 Oct. 2007, accessed 08 January 2015, <https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_Gate#/media/File: Cloud_Gate_(The_Bean)_ from_east%27.jpg>.
 As we have already seen through the distinction between the eroticism and the pornography —or 5
the erotic object and the pornographic one—. The pornographic does not correspond to a real need 
but presents an unrealizable one, whereby it, at the same time, creates the need it depicts.
 Warhol, Andy. 1963. Orange Car Crash Fourteen Times. Silkscreen ink on synthetic polymer paint on 6
two canvases. 8' 9 7/8" x 13' 8 1/8" in. Museum of  Modern Art, New York. Source: Flickr Creative 
Commmons, posted 2012, accessed, o8 Dec 2016, <https://flic.kr/p/cKVBp9>.
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of  the day; and confines them. This 
observation leads Steyerl to compare 
the industrial factory to the classical 
cinema, which both function in the 
same confining manner in regulating 
bodies. When going to the cinema 
people are together in a room from one 
set point in time until another, just like 
in the factory;  
workers leaving the factory. 
Spectators leaving the cinema –a 
similar mass, disciplined and 
controlled in time, assembled and 
released at regular intervals (Steyerl 
2012, 67).  
The museum, on the other hand, 
“doesn’t organize a coherent crowd of  
people. People are dispersed in time and 
space– a silent crowd, immersed and 
atomized” (67). Steyerl, therefore, 
stresses that there exists a “difference 
between mass and multitude”, which 
“arises on the line between confinement 
[that characterized the cinema and the 
factory] and dispersion”. The museum 
is characterized by the dispersion of  the 
multitude, the cinema by the mass. 
Bodies organized by the museum take 
on the shape of  the social factory, 
rather than that of  the industrial factory. 
By using the term of  the social factory, 
Steyerl refers to Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt’s theorization of  the 
phenomenon. The social factory, as 
Negri describes it, is the “factory 
without walls”, and represents the 
productive norm of  the “new epoch” 
that succeeded Fordism (Gill and Pratt 
2013). The era that Negri describes, it is 
marked by the factor y get t ing 
“increasingly disseminated out into 
society as a whole”. The social factory 
places “the whole society at the disposal 
of  profit” (28). Although the all-
encompassing effects of  post-Fordist 
production, as depicted by Negri, seem 
to have rather devastating effects of  
domination on the whole of  society, he 
equally asks himself: “what is the 
working class today, in this specific 
crisis, no longer merely as objects of  
exploitation, but the subject of  power?” 
(29). As Rosalind Gill and Andy Pratt 
explain: “more recent writing of  […] 
Neg r i (2004) focus [es ] on the 
potentialities and capacities of  the new 
post-Fordist proletariat, revisioned to fit 
their conceptualization of  the dispersed 
social factory, as multitude, operators 
and agents” (Gill and Pratt 2013, 29). 
This paper does not necessitate to go as 
far as mentioning the value of  the 
multitude that is seen by Hardt as a new 
social formation that offers new 
“possibilities of  acting politically”. 
However, seeing a potentiality of  
political engagement in a societal 
structure functioning according to the 
social factory model does imply that the 
latter form of  production allows for a 
space of  expression and self-initiated 
action. Consequently, the fact that 
Steyerl refers to the concept of  the 
social factory, clearly, indicates that she 
recognizes the museum visitor as an 
agent actively engaged within an 
unrestrained space, in opposition to the 
cinemagoer who is enclosed temporarily 
and spatially. 
It is valuable to put Steyerl’s view of  the 
museum as social factory in the light of  
Jonathan Beller’s vision on cinema that 
she supports, in order to consider it 
within Adorno’s theory of  the cultural 
commodity and alienation. Beller holds 
that “cinema and its derivatives —
television, internet, and so on— are 
f a c to r i e s , i n wh i ch spec t a to r s 
work” (Steyerl 2012, 65). He claims: “to 
look is to labor”. Steyerl, therefore, 
clearly sees a distinction between the 
cinemagoer and the visitor of  a 
museum, when engaged with the object 
of  interest. In Beller’s view, the term 
labour should be understood as the type 
of  work found in industrial factories. 
Mass production does not allow the 
worker to have any say in the 
production process, and often is 
engaged in the manufacture of  such a 
small part of  the whole commodity that 
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he or she is not even aware what the 
end result looks like. The type of  work 
Steyerl and Beller associate with the 
cinema, thus, is the type of  work that 
Marx calls estranging. The interaction 
between the cultural product, the film, 
the confining space, and the watcher, all 
contribute to the subject being reduced 
to a similar state of  passivity as found in 
industrial labour. Although Adorno 
does not emphasize the importance of  
space, he notices that the cultural 
industry by asking the  
rhetorical question, “What do 
people want?” addresses —as if  to 
ref lec t ive ind iv idua ls— [ i t s 
question] to those very people who 
are deliberately to be deprived of  
this individuality (Adorno and 
Horkheimer 1989, 144).  
The deprivation of  individuality that the 
culture industry undergoes via the 
denial or any agency on behalf  of  its 
consumers is carried out by means of  
determining what the desire of  the 
public might be; an endeavor that starts 
by asking the question: What do people 
want? As Adorno ironically, states:  
if  a movement from a Beethoven 
symphony is crudely “adapted” for 
a film sound-track in the same way 
as a Tolstoy novel is garbled in a 
film script: then the claim that this 
is done to satisfy the spontaneous 
wishes of  the public is no more 
than hot air (122).  
Space, however, as seen in Steyerl’s 
essay, contributes to this status of  
passivity of  the audience by controlling 
the way people are allowed to interact 
with an object. In a museum, a visitor 
can choose to spend more time 
contemplating one piece rather than 
another, or decide to leave in the middle 
of  a video projection. This free 
movement in space allows people to 
choose what they want to see rather 
than it being imposed on them. The 
way space is organized thus allows the 
visitor to make use of  his or her 
individuality, Adorno sees cinema to 
deprive the subject of. 
The art of  Emin, Warhol and Kapoor, 
equally, should be considered in terms 
of  the space they are being exhibited in, 
not only regarding the concrete material 
aspect of  the geographical, but also in 
view of  its symbolic significance. 
Emin’s My Bed and Warhol’s Orange Car 
Crash are both placed in the context of  
the museum and therefore lend 
themselves more easily to be subjected 
to Steyerl’s consideration of  the 
museum as a social factory. Because My 
Bed  and Orange Car Crash find 7
themselves in a space that gives people a 
degree of  liberty and that recognizes 
their individuality, both works can be 
contemplated in a sufficiently free 
manner as to sol ic i t conscious 
interaction between the one who 
observes and the artwork. In the case 
of  Cloud Gate, although not being 
placed in the traditional environment of  
an art institution, the interaction 
between passer-by and object functions 
in the same manner. Millennium Park is 
public space and thereby does not 
confine in anyway. The public is 
emancipated in terms of  seeing art in 
public space . When coming across a 8
 Since March 2015 Emin’s work is exhibited again in the space it was firstly shown to the public: Tate 7
Modern.
 Here of  course Arthur C. Danto’s influential essay “The Artworld” needs to be mentioned. When 8
the spectator is seen as “emancipated,” it is because he or she already possesses knowledge about 
what is considered to be art or not. “To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry
—an atmosphere of  artistic theory, a knowledge of  the history of  art: an artworld” (2017, 580). This 
does not undermine the main claim of  the essay, as it argues that interaction between space, object 
and subject to be one of  the main factors in triggering interpretation. 
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sculpture someone is aware that it is a 
work or art, just like Cloud Gate is. 
However, My Bed, would not function 
within the same context as Cloud Gate, 
since it does not bear the marks of  the 
type of  art that is normally seen in 
public space. The artwork of  Emin 
would probably be considered as illegal 
waste dumping. An aspect that Steyerl 
does not take into consideration, the 
symbolic significance of  spaces, 
therefore, is very important for the 
manner in which a work of  art interacts 
with subjects. In 1917, Marcel 
Duchamp a l ready showed how 
important the meaning of  context is, by 
placing his ready-made, or mass-
produced urinal signed “R. Mutt” on a 
plinth in a gallery whereby it began to 
be considered as artwork. The museum, 
as the ultimate space dedicated to art, 
immediately asks the visitor to consider 
objects at display as art and to engage 
with them: to think. My Bed, in the same 
manner as Duchamp’s Fontaine, stirred 
vivid debate regarding the question of  
the meaning of  art and whether these 
mass-produced products should be 
worthy of  the name. The debate in 
itself  already shows, hereby, that the 
objects accord a great amount of  
agency and individuality to the observer 
who can, by reflecting upon the work 
of  art think about his or her own 
considerations of  what ought or ought 
not be honored a place in the museum. 
Certainly, the space in which an object is 
presented needs to be adequate for a 
subject to engage with it freely: he or 
she being able to decide whether to 
grant it any attention. However, if  the 
object of  inquiry does not incite 
interaction in anyway, i.e., Emin’s bed 
being placed on a public square, 
interpretation on behalf  of  the viewer 
cannot occur, and neither does escape 
from alienation. It could be said that the 
symbolic significance of  a given space 
of  contemplation, such as Millennium 
Park, is communicated to its passers-by 
through the relation between the 
sculpture, Cloud Gate, the place and, as 
earlier mentioned, acquired knowledge 
about art in public spaces. An object, 
any object, can, by being in a space that 
allows for people to move freely and 
which carries a connotation that calls 
for it to be viewed as art, demand on 
behalf  of  the viewer its active 
participation.  
Adorno defines cultural products 
conceived in industrial fashion as 
objects that rob the consumer of  its 
individuality. Popular culture allows no 
thinking, or no creativity, on behalf  of  
the spectator. High art, however, 
u n d e r g o e s a w h o l l y d i f f e r e n t 
relationship with the viewer: it respects 
his or her agency. The lack of  humanity 
that is granted to the audience by 
entertainment makes it reminiscent of  
the estrangement caused by industrial 
labour. Just like factory workers cannot 
recognize themselves in the products of  
their labour, cinemagoers cannot 
recognize themselves in the stories of  
Hollywood. The culture industry offers 
no escape from daily hardships. 
Adorno’s writings indicate that art, on 
the contrary to amusement, permit to 
elude the estrangement of  the work 
environment. However, whereas the 
philosopher suggests that the latter 
quality is inherent to the object, 
examples from contemporary art, such 
as My Bed, show it not to be the case. 
The ability of  objects to call for its 
observer to interact, and to reflect, 
resides in the relation that the work of  
art undergoes with the space it finds 
itself  in, and subsequently, with the 
viewer. The context an object is in, thus, 
is determinate in engendering its 
capability to offer a way to elude 
estrangement. Contemporary art, as 
shown by the examples used, appears to 
be in a quite advantageous position to 
offer a vehicle by the means of  which 
subjects can recognize themselves, and 
thereby, realize themselves as free 
conscious beings. Adorno states that 
“[s]erious art has been withheld from 
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those for whom the hardship and 
oppression of  life make a mockery of  
seriousness, and who must be glad if  
they can use time not spent at the 
p r o d u c t i o n l i n e j u s t t o k e e p 
going” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1989, 
135). However, when staying within the 
same geographical area Marx was 
concerned with, Adorno’s statement has 
become eroded. Cloud Gate, already is an 
example of  how art can reach out to 
society in a less exclusive manner. As 
Negri and Hardt claim, society in the 
21st century is not orchestrated in the 
same manner as during the times of  
Fordism, and the way everyone is 
engaged in generating profit today, 
putting an increasing number of  people 
in the position of  operators, offers new 
perspectives for social organization. Art, 
especially in the public sphere, or at 
least in a space accessible to all, by the 
way in which it accords agency to the 
observer, offers a moment of  resistance 
to estrangement. It could be further 
imagined how art can function as a 
strategic element in the new agency and 
political potentiality that subjects gained 
within the post-Fordist world. 
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